

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 13691 01 OF 04 261853Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-12 AID-05 MMO-01 COME-00
DLOS-09 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 HA-05 CIAE-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 DOE-15 DOEE-00
SOE-02 NRC-05 MCT-02 /115 W
-----070667 261931Z /42

O P 261839Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0613
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CMC WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OHIO
JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
CNO WASHDC
CSA WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 13691

ALSO FOR ACDA AND AID

E.O. 11652: XGDS-L
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, GW
SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE: ANNUAL INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT

REFS: (A) STATE 182987 DTG 192201Z JUL 78
(B) STATE 168320 DTG 031928Z JUL 78
(C) STATE 167901 DTG 010215Z JUL 78

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST IN REF C,
THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE 1978 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSES-
MENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY. IT DESCRIBES THE FUNDAMENTAL NEED FOR A
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 13691 01 OF 04 261853Z

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE FRG, DISCUSSES THE
MILITARY THREAT, AND BRIEFLY ANALYZES FRG DEFENSE
SPENDING. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF C, WE SHALL SUBMIT
BY MAY 1, 1979, A DETAILED PROJECTION OF FRG REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR SPECIFIC DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES. SINCE
OUR PROGRAM IN GERMANY CONSISTS OF FOREIGN MILITARY
SALES ONLY AND IS NOT BUDGETED, SOME OF THE REQUIREMENTS

IN REF C, PARTICULARLY THOSE SET FORTH IN PARA 13, DO NOT APPLY IN OUR CASE. END SUMMARY.

1. THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN GERMANY IS KEYED TO PARA 3A, POINTS 1 THROUGH 6 OF REF C.

US INTERESTS WHICH ARE SERVED BY A SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

2. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE FRG SERVES FUNDAMENTAL US INTERESTS BECAUSE THE FRG IS A MAJOR ALLY WHOSE CONTINUED STRENGTH IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY. THROUGH THE PROGRAM WE PROVIDE SIZEABLE QUANTITIES OF SOPHISTICATED U.S. EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES (BUNDESWEHR). THE BUNDESWEHR IS VITAL TO THE SECURITY OF NATO AS A WHOLE, SINCE IT IS THE LARGEST CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCE IN NATO EUROPE AND COMPRISES ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF THE WESTERN FORCES IN THE NATO FORWARD AREA. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE HELPS TO ENSURE AN UP-TO-DATE BUNDESWEHR, AND IT CONTRIBUTES TO GREATER WEAPONS COMMONALITY AND EQUIPMENT INTEROPERABILITY WITHIN NATO.

SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES IN THE FRG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 13691 01 OF 04 261853Z

3. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO:

A) PROVIDE SOPHISTICATED US MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE BUNDESWEHR THROUGH FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS);

B) PROVIDE FORMAL TRAINING TO BUNDESWEHR PERSONNEL IN THE UTILIZATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE EQUIPMENT WHICH WE MAKE AVAILABLE;

C) GIVE ADVICE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE FRG IN CONNECTION WITH THE EQUIPMENT WHICH WE PROVIDE;

D) FOSTER US-FRG CO-DEVELOPMENT AND CO-PRODUCTION OF SELECTED WEAPON SYSTEMS;

E) ENHANCE INTEROPERABILITY, RATIONALIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS WITHIN NATO;

F) MAINTAIN A COOPERATIVE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRG ON ARMAMENTS QUESTIONS;

G) ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO GREATER MOVEMENT TOWARD GERMANY ON THE "2-WAY STREET" OF WEAPONS COOPERATION;

H) ASSIST GERMANY IN THE IDENTIFICATION AND PROPER DISPOSITION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MATERIAL THAT IS

EXCESS TO CURRENT NEEDS.

STATEMENT OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREAT AS PERCEIVED

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 13691 02 OF 04 261859Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-12 AID-05 MMO-01 COME-00

DLOS-09 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 HA-05 CIAE-00

H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15

NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 DOE-15 DOEE-00

SOE-02 NRC-05 MCT-02 /115 W

-----070768 261931Z /42

O P 261839Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0614

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

JCS WASHDC PRIORITY

CMC WASHDC

DISM WPAFB OHIO

CNO WASHDC

CSA WASHDC

CSAF WASHDC

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 13691

BY THE FRG

4. EXTERNAL THREAT: THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES PERCEIVE
THE EXTERNAL THREAT AS DERIVING MAINLY FROM:

A) THE MASSIVE OVERALL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE
WARSAW PACT;

B) THE IMMEDIATE GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF THE WARSAW
PACT FORCES;

C) THE OVERWHELMING WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY IN GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS;

D) THE GROWING IMBALANCE, IN THE WARSAW PACT'S FAVOR,
IN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES;

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 13691 02 OF 04 261859Z

E) THE SUPERIORITY OF WARSAW PACT NAVAL FORCES IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE BALTIC APPROACHES;
F) THE WORLD-WIDE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET NAVY AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUSLY DISRUPTING THE VITAL TRANS-ATLANTIC WARTIME SUPPLY ROUTES TO EUROPE.

5. THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO ATTACK THE FRG AT THE TIME AND PLACE OF ITS CHOOSING WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE MOBILIZATION. A MAJOR WARSAW PACT ATTACK PROBABLY WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL AFTER A PERIOD OF POLITICAL CRISIS AND ADDITIONAL MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. HOWEVER, THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THAT A SURPRISE ATTACK WITH THE FORCES IN BEING CANNOT TOTALLY BE RULED OUT.

6. THE GERMANS CONSIDER THAT THE MOST PROBABLE ROUTE OF AN ATTACK WOULD BE ACROSS THE NORTH GERMAN PLAIN WITH A CONCURRENT ATTACK IN THE FULDA GAP. HOWEVER, THERE IS ALSO DEEP CONCERN, PARTICULARLY IN BAVARIA, THAT A MAJOR ATTACK COULD COME THROUGH CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR EVEN ACROSS NEUTRAL AUSTRIA. THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES ASSUME THAT WARSAW PACT NAVAL FORCES WOULD LAUNCH AMPHIBIOUS ATTACKS AT THE FRG'S BALTIC COAST AND MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO BLOCK ALLIED ACCESS TO BREMERHAVEN, HAMBURG, AND OTHER KEY GERMAN PORTS ON THE NORTH SEA.

7. INTERNAL THREAT: ALTHOUGH A TERRORISM PROBLEM EXISTS IN GERMANY AS IN MANY MODERN INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS, THERE IS NO INTERNAL THREAT IN THE FRG WHICH IS RELEVANT IN A US SECURITY ASSISTANCE CONTEXT.

THE FRG'S STRATEGIES TO MEET THE EXTERNAL MILITARY THREAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 13691 02 OF 04 261859Z

8. IN THE BROADEST SENSE, THE FRG STRATEGY TO MEET THE THREAT CONSISTS OF A CLOSE ALLIANCE WITH THE US IN THE NATO CONTEXT. BECAUSE OF THE OVERWHELMING POWER OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THEIR IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY, THE FRG WOULD CLEARLY BE UNABLE TO ENSURE ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT RELIANCE ON THE US AND ITS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

9. IT IS CLEAR TO THE FRG AUTHORITIES THAT THE SECURITY OF THEIR COUNTRY MUST BE BASED PRIMARILY ON EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE VIA ALL THREE LEGS OF THE NATO TRIAD. HOWEVER, THEY FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, THE FRG MUST BE DEFENDED AS FAR FORWARD AND AS TENACIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE ALONG THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF ITS BORDER WITH THE WARSAW PACT STATES. THEY CONSIDER THIS ESSENTIAL, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE NARROW WIDTH OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE FACT THAT ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF ITS POPULATION AND 25 PERCENT OF ITS INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY ARE LOCATED WITHIN A 100-KILOMETER-WIDE ZONE ALONG THE BORDER OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES. THUS, TO THE GERMAN MIND, FORWARD DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLY A STRATEGIC CONCEPT; IT IS THE VERY KEY TO NATIONAL SURVIVAL SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL.

10. TO THE GERMAN STRATEGISTS, A QUICK WESTERN REACTION TO A POSSIBLE WARSAW PACT ATTACK WOULD BE OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE IN VIEW OF THE FRG'S LACK OF GEOGRAPHIC DEPTH. JUST AS THIS GEOGRAPHIC, OR SPACE, FACTOR WORKS AGAINST THE FRG, SO DOES THE TIME FACTOR: SINCE THE EAST WOULD BE THE AGGRESSOR, IT WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE AND COULD CHOOSE BOTH THE TIME AND THE PLACE FOR ITS ATTACK. FOR THE FRG AND THE WEST GENERALLY, IT WOULD BE OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO HAVE MAXIMUM WARNING OF A WARSAW PACT ATTACK.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BONN 13691 02 OF 04 261859Z

MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 13691 03 OF 04 261903Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-12 AID-05 MMO-01 COME-00
DLOS-09 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 HA-05 CIAE-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15

NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 DOE-15 DOEE-00

SOE-02 NRC-05 MCT-02 /115 W

-----070836 261930Z /43

O P 261839Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0615

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

JCS WASHDC PRIORITY

CMC WASHDC

DISAM WPAFB OHO

CNO WASHDC

CSA WASHDC

CSAF WASHDC

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 13691

11. OUR PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT IS FUNDAMENTALLY IN LINE WITH THAT OF THE FRG AUTHORITIES. THERE ARE OF COURSE DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE BETWEEN THE US AND GERMAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE GLOBAL THREAT BECAUSE OF THE VERY DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIC SITUATIONS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. MOREOVER, IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE FRG FEELS SOMEWHAT MORE THREATENED THAN DOES THE US BY THE GROWING IMBALANCE IN EUROPEAN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHICH THE FRG CONSIDERS SUITED TO MEET THE THREAT:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 13691 03 OF 04 261903Z

12. THE BUNDESWEHR IS LIMITED IN PEACETIME TO 499,000 MEN BY THE PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SIGNED AT PARIS ON OCTOBER 23, 1954. AS A MATTER OF FRG POLICY, THE FULL PEACETIME STRENGTH OF THE BUNDESWEHR IS FIXED AT 495,000. ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH VARIES; IT IS PRESENTLY ABOUT 487,700.

13. ALSO, UNDER THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PARIS PROTOCOL, THE FRG UNDERTOOK NOT TO MANUFACTURE THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS, INTER ALIA: ATOMIC, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; LONG-RANGE MISSILES, GUIDED MISSILES, AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES.

14. WITHIN THE ABOVE CONSTRAINTS, THE FRG CONSIDERS THAT THE BUNDESWEHR CAN BE MOST LOGICALLY CONFIGURED

AS FOLLOWS:

15. ARMY: (PRESENT STRENGTH APPROX. 340,000 MEN)
THE BULK OF THE BUNDESWEHR SHOULD BE, AND IS, ALLOCATED TO THE ARMY AS A MEANS OF COUNTERBALANCING, TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE, THE MASSIVE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF THE WARSAW PACT. BECAUSE OF THE WARSAW PACT'S OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS, THE EMPHASIS IN THE FRG ARMY IS ON ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY.

16. SINCE IT IS POLITICALLY UNLIKELY THAT THERE COULD BE MAJOR INCREASES IN THE STATIONED GROUND FORCES IN THE FRG OF THE US AND THE OTHER SENDING STATES, THE FRG ARMY WILL CONTINUE TO CONSTITUTE THE BULK OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION. SINCE THE FRG ARMY CANNOT BE INCREASED IN SIZE EXCEPT IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF SIGNIFICANT DECREASES IN THE FRG
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 13691 03 OF 04 261903Z

AIR FORCE AND/OR NAVY, THE EMPHASIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY, MAINLY THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF MORE MODERN TECHNOLOGY. TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE, THE FRG WOULD LIKE TO INCREASE THE GERMAN ARMY'S ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY THROUGH PROCUREMENT OF MORE MODERN AND EFFECTIVE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS.

17. AIR FORCE: (PRESENT STRENGTH APPROX. 110,000 MEN)
THE UNITS OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE CONSTITUTE ONE-THIRD OF NATO AIR FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION. THE PRIMARY MISSIONS OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE ARE TO:

- A) ENSURE THE AIR DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND;
- B) LAUNCH CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS AT ENEMY SUPPLY LINES AND DEPOTS IN ORDER TO SLOW THE ADVANCE OF NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR GROUND FORCES;
- C) DENY THE INTRODUCTION OF REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE ENEMY'S REAR.

18. NAVY: (PRESENT STRENGTH APPROX. 37,700 MEN)
THE ESSENTIAL MISSION OF THE GERMAN NAVY IS TO DEFEND THE BALTIC APPROACHES AND COUNTER ENEMY NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE BALTIC AND NORTH SEAS. IN THE BALTIC, THE EMPHASIS IS ON FAST PATROL BOATS WHICH WOULD WARD OFF ATTACKS BY AMPHIBIOUS UNITS AND DESTROY THEIR COVERING FORCES. IN THE NORTH SEA, THE EMPHASIS IS ON DESTROYERS, FRIGATES AND SUBMARINES WHICH WOULD ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE SEA LANES OPEN TO BREMERHAVEN, HAMBURG, AND OTHER KEY GERMAN NORTH SEA PORTS.

FRG ARMED FORCES IN RELATION TO US INTERESTS AND
ALTERNATIVES

19. THE CONFIGURATION AND THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BONN 13691 03 OF 04 261903Z

THE FRG'S ARMED FORCES ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 13691 04 OF 04 261904Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-12 AID-05 MMO-01 COME-00
DLOS-09 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 HA-05 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 DOEE-00
SOE-02 NRC-05 MCT-02 /100 W
-----070871 261930Z /43

O P 261839Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0616
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
CNO WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
DISAM WPAF OHIO
CSA WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 13691

US INTERESTS. FURTHERMORE, FRG COMMITMENTS UNDER THE
NATO LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM SHOULD LEAD TO A
BUNDESWEHR WHICH COINCIDES EVEN MORE PRECISELY
WITH OUR OWN INTERESTS AND COMPLEMENTS THE REMAINDER

OF NATO EUROPE'S FORCES IN AN EVEN MORE RATIONAL
MANNER.

GERMAN DEFENSE SPENDING IN RELATION TO THE ECONOMY
AS A WHOLE

20. THE FRG DEFENSE BUDGET REPRESENTS 2.8 PERCENT OF
GNP AND 19.2 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET. WE HAVE
NO FIGURES ON OVERALL MILITARY IMPORTS, BUT IN CY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 13691 04 OF 04 261904Z

1977, UNITED STATES FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO THE
FRG TOTALED \$352 MILLION.

21. FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS GERMAN DEFENSE EXPENDI-
TURES SHOULD CONTINUE TO REPRESENT ABOUT 3 PERCENT
OF GNP. MARGINAL DEVIATIONS FROM THIS FIGURE WILL
HAVE MINIMAL IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY.

22. FRG DEFENSE INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO
FILL GERMAN AND OTHER NATO NEEDS. DEFENSE-RELATED
PRODUCTION CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO PLAY A
MINOR ROLE IN THE FRG'S INDUSTRIAL AND EXPORTING
CAPABILITY.

23. THE FRG HAS NO FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING
PROBLEMS.

24. THE FOLLOWING ARE RELEVANT ECONOMIC DATA FOR
CY 1977 (IN 1977, THE AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE WAS
DM 2.32 TO \$1.00):

GNP	DM 1,193 BILLION
TOTAL FEDERAL	
BUDGET	DM 171 BILLION
DEFENSE BUDGET	DM 33 BILLION

25. THE FRG'S POSITION AS A MAJOR INDUSTRIAL POWER
DOES NOT DEPEND ON ITS ARMS INDUSTRY. ON THE CON-
TRARY, THERE IS A CONSCIOUS POLICY OF AVOIDING
DEVELOPMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL ARMS INDUSTRY.
IN THIS REGARD, COMPANIES ARE NOT ALLOWED TO REACH
THE POINT WHERE THEIR VIABILITY DEPENDS ON ARMS-
RELATED PRODUCTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 13691 04 OF 04 261904Z

ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HOST
COUNTRY AS THEY RELATE TO THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM

26. SUCH AN ASSESSMENT IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE
CASE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. HUMAN
RIGHTS ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED IN THE FRG'S DEMO-
CRATIC SYSTEM, AND THEY DO NOT RELATE IN ANY WAY TO
OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HERE. MEEHAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BONN13691
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1 L
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780306-1130
Format: TEL
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780716/aaaaanfy.tel
Line Count: 504
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e345d76b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 182987, 78 STATE 168320, 78 STATE 167901
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1872750
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECURITY ASSISTANCE: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, GE, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e345d76b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014